The recent experience with low in ‡ation has reopened interest in the liquidity trap; which occurs when the nominal interest rate reaches its zero lower bound. To reduce the real interest rate, and to stimulate the economy, the modern literature highlights the role of high in ‡ationary expectations. Using the Dixit-Lambertini (2003) framework of strategic policy interaction, we …nd that the optimal institutional response to the possibility of a liquidity trap has two main components. First, an optimal in ‡ation target given to the Central Bank. Second, the Treasury, who retains control over …scal policy and acts as leader, is given optimal output and in ‡ation targets. This keeps in ‡ationary expectations su¢ ciently high and achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment solution. Simulations show that this arrangement is (1) optimal even when the Treasury has no in ‡ation target but follow's the optimal output target and (2) 'near optimal' even when the Treasury follows its own agenda through a suboptimal output target but is willing to follow an optimal in ‡ation target. Finally, if monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal in ‡ation target, but the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, then the outcome can be a very poor one.
Introduction
In its classical form, the liquidity trap, a term coined by Keynes (1936) , is a situation where an economy is caught up in a de ‡ation and the nominal interest rate has been driven down to zero (the so called 'zero bound'). The source of a liquidity trap, in most circumstances, is a sharp fall in aggregate demand; see Keynes (1936) , Bernanke (2002) . Interest in the liquidity trap has revived in recent years due, in no small measure, to the experience of Japan since 1990. Woodford (2005, p29 ) discusses the near miss of the US economy from a liquidity trap in the summer of 2003. The era of successful delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks with low in ‡ation targets 1 opens up the possibility that su¢ ciently large negative demand shocks might push an economy into a liquidity trap with huge associated welfare consequences 2 . For example, Blanchard (2003) raises the possibility of the following scenario: high USA de…cits force a devaluation of the dollar and, hence, an appreciation of the Euro. With already low interest rates in the Euro area, and with …scal policy circumscribed by the stability and growth pact, the Euro area may well be forced into a liquidity trap. Traditional monetary policy loses its e¤ectiveness because nominal interest rates can be reduced no further in order to boost the interest sensitive components of aggregate demand. Hence, reliance must be placed on other, possibly more expensive, policies. Keynes (1936) , in the …rst policy prescription for a liquidity trap, suggested the use of …scal policy, which works through the multiplier e¤ect to boost output and employment.
However, the recent literature has largely focussed on monetary policy and the role of expectations. Krugman (1998 Krugman ( , 1999 ) reformulated the liquidity trap as a situation where an economy requires a negative real interest rate. With nominal interest rates bound below by zero, the only way in which a negative real interest rate can be achieved is to have an expectation of positive in ‡ation 3 . This, in turn, creates a need for a credible commitment to the future level of actual in ‡ation because after the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties to reduce in ‡ation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low future in ‡ation. But then the real interest rate remains positive, keeping the economy in a liquidity trap. The subsequent literature on the liquidity trap has also considered exchange rate poli- 1 Average in ‡ation rates in successive decades from the 1950's on to the current decade show a declining trend; see Table 1 in Svensson (2003) . 2 High unemployment is an obvious fallout of a liquidity trap. An increase in the real value of private debt has further adverse consequences particularly for the …nancial sector. An increase in the real public debt creates a di¢ cult problem for the government to increase taxes to balance its books on the one hand but risk getting mired deeper into a recession on the other. 3 The real interest rate is given by r = i e where i is the nominal interest rate and e is expected in ‡ation. In a liquidity trap, i = 0 and typically e < 0, hence r > 0. To expand economic activity, the government needs to lower r; one possible solution is to generate positive in ‡ationary expectations. cies such as currency depreciation, integral stabilization, a carry tax on currency, open market operations in long term bonds, price level targets, and money growth rate pegs. The surveys in Svensson (2003) and Blinder (2000) consider these policies in detail, however, these policies have important limitations 4;5 . Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) recommends abandonment of an independent central bank and a return to discretionary policy by a unitary monetary-…scal authority. A debt …nanced …scal expansion during a liquidity trap results, via the government budget constraint, in higher expectations of future in ‡ation. Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either monetary policy alone or uncoordinated monetary and …scal policy. However, as Eggertsson shows, even optimal discretion is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations solution with commitment. Moreover, abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a narrow mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears to be a retrograde step. 6 In this paper, we …nd that the optimal institutional response to the possibility of a liquidity trap has two main components. First, an optimal in ‡ation target given to the operationally independent Central Bank. Second, the Treasury, who retains control over …scal policy and acts as leader, is given optimal output and in ‡ation targets. This keeps in ‡ationary expectations su¢ ciently high and achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment solution. Simulations show that this arrangement is (1) optimal even when the Treasury has no in ‡ation target but follows the optimal output target and (2) 'near optimal'even when the Treasury follows its own agenda through a suboptimal output target but is willing to follow an optimal in ‡ation target. Finally, if monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal in ‡ation target, but the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, then the outcome can be a very poor one.
The Japanese experience: …scal policy
The Japanese experience with the liquidity trap since the 1990's is now well documented; for instance, Posen (1998) . Here we emphasize three points 7 .
J1 Potency of …scal policy in a liquidity trap: The large budget de…cits in Japan over the 1990's, with debt reaching a peak of about 140 percent of GDP, have sometimes formed the basis for the conclusion that Japanese …scal policy was not e¤ective in the liquidity trap. However, this view is at variance with the empirical evidence; for instance Posen (1998) , Kuttner and Posen (2001) , Iwamura et al. (2005) and Ball (2005) . Kuttner and Posen show that tax revenues fell through the de ‡ation of the 1990's. Worried by the special demographic problems faced by Japan, the budget de…cits largely funded existing expenditure commitments. It follows that the stabilization component of Japanese …scal policy in the 1990's was quite weak. Kuttner and Posen show that when the …scal stimulus was strong, such as in the …scal package of 1995, it worked in stimulating GDP. On the whole, however, expansionary …scal policies were largely o¤set by other contractionary components of …scal policy such as an increase in the national consumption tax from 3 percent to 5 percent, increase in the contribution rates to social security and the repeal of temporary tax cuts. It is useful to cite more fully from Posen (1998) . He writes "The reality of Japanese …scal policy in the 1990's is less mysterious and ultimately, more disappointing. The actual amount injected into the economy by the Japanese government-through either public spending or tax reductions-was about a third of the total amount announced. This limited quantity of total …scal stimulus was disbursed in ine¢ ciently sized and ine¢ ciently administered doses with the exception of the 1995 stimulus package. The package did result in solid growth in 1996, demonstrating that …scal policy does work when it is tried....On net, the Japanese …scal stance in the 1990's was barely expansionary." The empirical results of Iwamura et. al (2005) and Ball (2005) lend strong support to the …nding of Kuttner and Posen. Eggertsson (2006b) calculates a de…cit spending multiplier of 3.76, which is much higher than previously thought.
J2 Lack of appropriate institutions and incentives for policy makers: The inability of the Japanese Treasury to follow through with an appropriate …scal stimulus suggests the possibility of inadequate institutional foundations to deal with the liquidity trap. For instance, the Japanese …scal and monetary authorities did not have any explicit output/ in ‡ation targets prior to the onset of the liquidity trap that (1) might have created incentives for an appropriate response, and (2) altered expectations, particularly in ‡ationary expectations, that could have dampened the liquidity trap.
J3 Lack of coordination between the …scal and monetary authorities: Competing policy authorities might disagree on the appropriate response to a liquidity trap, possibly worsening the situation. For instance, the empirical results of Iwamura et. al (2005) indicate lack of coordination between the monetary and …scal policy authorities. They write "It also suggests that policy coordination between the government and the Bank of Japan did not work well during this period, in the sense that the government deviated from the Ricardian rule towards …scal tightening while the BOJ (Bank of Japan) adopted a zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing." Eggertsson (2006b) calculates a de…cit spending multiplier of exactly zero, for this scenario.
About our paper
To motivate our paper we ask the following three questions.
Q1 Is there strategic policy interaction between the various policy makers? Models of strategic monetary and …scal policy interaction have recently been given a new impetus by the work of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) (which, however, do not consider a liquidity trap). Issues of strategic interaction between policy makers assume even greater signi…cance during times of extreme recessions as the Japanese experience (J3 above) indicates. However, issues of strategic policy interaction between monetary and …scal authorities are completely ignored by the theoretical work on the liquidity trap. Typically the only policy considered is monetary policy and so issues of strategic interaction do not arise 8 . On the other hand, when multiple policies are considered, their strategic interaction is not considered 9 .
Q2 Can liquidity traps occur in equilibrium? One strand of the literature considers policies that could mitigate the e¤ects of liquidity traps. The other strand prescribes policies that would prevent the economy 8 Examples are Krugman (1998) from ever falling into a liquidity trap 10 . In general, the optimal policy for our model allows the economy to fall into a liquidity trap with some probability. Thus our model is in the economics tradition that stresses limiting economic bads (e.g. externalities) to their 'optimal level', rather than complete elimination 11 .
Q3 Is the perspective ex-ante or ex-post?
The literature typically asks either one of the following two questions. (1) What is the optimal institutional design (assignments of targets and instruments to the various policy makers) when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap in the future? (2) Given that the economy is in a liquidity trap, what actions can be taken to eliminate the liquidity trap 12 . There is considerable disagreement on both questions, particularly the latter. An ex-ante perspective allows one to plan optimally for a problem before it arises, while an ex-post approach is mainly concerned with damage control. Furthermore, the announcements of policy makers during a liquidity trap (an ex-post perspective) might carry little credibility for the public. Hence, ideally one would like to look at the appropriate institutional design prior to the onset of a liquidity trap (an ex-ante perspective).
We describe our paper as follows. We would answer yes to the …rst two questions and 'ex-ante perspective'to the third. We consider strategic interaction between monetary and …scal authorities in a simple aggregate supply -aggregate demand model similar to the one in Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) but extended to allow for a liquidity trap and the e¤ect of in ‡ationary expectations in the aggregate supply curve. There is some possibility that the economy will fall into a liquidity trap in some state of the world in the future. Our central concern is to identify optimal institutional arrangements 13 from an ex-ante perspective. Figure 1 .1 summarizes our paper in relation to the existing literature. 10 In the …rst group are Krugman (1998) 11 A dental analogy might be appropriate here. Tooth decay can be prevented by extracting all the child's teeth. But, normally, the optimal policy is not to extract; tooth decay then occurs with some probability. 12 In the …rst group are Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002), Shin-Ichi (2003), Clouse et al. (2003) , Buiter-Panigirtzoglou (2003) . In the second group are papers by Ball (2005) , Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) . Finally there are papers that touch on both ex-ante and ex-post issues, for instance, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) , McCallum (2000) , Bernanke (2002) , Svensson (2003) . 13 By optimality or near optimality we mean regimes that help us to attain or get very close to the optimal rational expectations (or pre-commitment) solution. 
Some results and intuition
As pointed out above, Krugman identi…ed the solution to a liquidity trap as creating high enough in ‡ationary expectations. However, under discretion, promises of high in ‡ation will not be believed. This is because outside a liquidity trap the correct value for the real interest rate can be achieved more cheaply with zero in ‡ation. Therefore, if the economy turns out not to be liquidity trapped, the Treasury has an incentive to renege on its promise of high in ‡ation. A rational forward looking private sector will anticipate this. The result is low in ‡ation expectations, keeping the real interest rate too high in a liquidity trap. Notice that unlike the standard analysis conducted in the absence of a liquidity trap the discretionary outcome can be suboptimal relative to the precommitment outcome because it creates too little in ‡ation (Eggertsson (2006a,b) calls this the de ‡ation bias).
We suggest an institutional solution, the optimal delegation regime, that achieves the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution for all parameter values in our model. The optimal delegation regime seems broadly in line with the successful arrangements introduced by the British Chancellor Gordon Brown in 1997 and seems entirely natural. This regime has three components. First, the Treasury acts as Stackelberg leader and the Central Bank as follower. Second, an in ‡ation target is given to a Central Bank who has exclusive control over monetary policy. Outside a liquidity trap, where monetary policy is e¤ective, the Treasury would rather not use the relatively more costly …scal stabilization policy, leaving the Central Bank to perform the stabilization function. Because the Central Bank is operationally independent and its sole objective is achieving monetary stability, this type of delegation provides a commitment to the necessary in ‡ation level when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Our third component is to give the Treasury, who retains control of …scal policy, something like a Taylor rule, which penalizes deviations of output from an output target and in ‡ation from the in ‡ation target. This gives the Treasury the correct incentive to undertake the appropriate (but costly) …scal stimulus in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is ine¤ective. Consequently, in ‡ation expectations are at the right level to produce the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity trap. For a variety of reasons, e.g. electoral concerns, the output target of the Treasury may di¤er from the optimal target. In this case, we …nd that even if the Treasury's output target is substantially di¤erent from the optimal output target, this suboptimal delegation regime achieves close to the optimal solution and is much better than discretion. While it may appear reasonable to assign an in ‡ation target to the Central Bank, it may be asked why should the Treasury have an in ‡ation target, as well as an output target? To answer this question, we de…ne two further regimes: the output nutter regime, where the Treasury has an output target but not an in ‡ation target; and the reckless output nutter regime where the Treasury has an output target but does not have an in ‡ation target and does not care about the cost of …scal policy. It turns out that so long as the Treasury follows the optimal output target, then delegation achieves the optimal solution even in the regimes of the output nutter and the reckless output nutter. However, in the latter two cases, the delegation regime is not robust; in the sense that if the output target of the Treasury is di¤erent from the optimal target, then performance is poor and can be much worse than under discretion. Hence, giving the Treasury an in ‡ation target (as well as an output target), while not essential for optimality, adds to the robustness of the policy. In particular the hybrid regime where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal in ‡ation target, while the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and …scal policy. We summarize these results in Figure 1 .2. In each regime the central bank follows its optimally assigned in ‡ation target.
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between monetary and …scal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a su¢ ciently high in ‡ation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates su¢ ciently high in ‡ation expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ‡oor. While this policy would always avoid the liquidity trap, it is not optimal because in ‡ation is costly. Analogously it is not optimal to give the Treasury too high an output target because if a liquidity trap occurs, it would use the costly …scal policy excessively. The optimal solution then is to have a mix of both i.e. some in ‡ation outside a liquidity trap and some dependence on costly …scal policy in a liquidity trap.
The …rst best is achieved if one could remove the distortions that cause the liquidity trap. The second best obtains with the optimal rational expectations commitment solution. The third best is achieved with various institutional design features introduced into policy making. The fourth best obtains under discretion. It is well known that, in the absence of a liquidity trap, 'optimal institution design', such as Walsh contracts, can achieve the second best. Our suggested institutional design achieves the second best in the presence of a liquidity trap.
Optimal Control versus Game Theory
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To simplify the dynamic game-theoretic analysis we follow the tradition, established in the time-inconsistency literature 15 , of abstracting from structural dynamic issues, notably, capital formation, the term structure of interest rates, exchange rate policy and the …-nancing of the stabilization component of …scal policy. Concentrating on the aggregate demand consequences of investment expenditure, but abstracting from its contribution to growth, is standard in models of the business cycle, and is a feature of all the models of the liquidity trap (as far as we know). Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , in a structurally dynamic model of monetary policy with a …nancial sector and a zero lower bound on interest rates, show that the short-run interest rate (which is the instrument of policy) determines all other interest rates and exchange rates. As they clearly explain, open market operations only work to the extent that they enhance the credibility of policy. Thus, and in common with many models, we take the short-run interest rate as directly a¤ecting aggregate demand and we abstract from open economy aspects.
We o¤er two arguments that mitigate not explicitly modelling the government budget constraint. First, we assign a higher welfare loss to the use of …scal policy relative to monetary policy. The cost of using …scal policy could include deadweight losses, costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for default. Second, in all equilibria of our model, …scal policy is not used for stabilization purposes outside a liquidity trap. In a calibrated model of Japan, Ball (2005) shows that the combination of higher output, higher tax revenues and higher in ‡ation outside the liquidity trap is more than adequate to …nance the extra 14 We take this title from Blanchard (2006, p581) . 15 See, for example, Romer (2006, chapter 10) and Walsh (2003, chapter 8) .
…scal spending during the liquidity trap.
Nevertheless, we incorporate an element of structural dynamics resulting from persistence in demand shocks (section 5). We believe that our model thus reproduces the essentials of the problems associated with a liquidity trap: persistence, credibility and monetary-…scal coordination, in a clear and simple way.
Schematic outline
The model is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 derives the two benchmark solutions: the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution and the discretionary solution. Section 4 derives the optimal delegation solution. Section 5 demonstrates the robustness of the model by allowing for the full set of parameters, persistence of demand shocks and several alternative formulations of the Treasury's objectives. Section 6 discusses the relation of our paper to the literature. Section 7 concludes with a brief summary. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
Model
In this section we describe the most parsimonious version of the model. In Section 5 below, we demonstrate the robustness of the results of this model with respect to the full set of parameters, persistent demand shocks, a general probability distribution over the two states of nature, and further considerations about the Treasury's objectives.
Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
We use an aggregate demand and supply framework that is similar to Ball (2005) , Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) . The aggregate demand and supply equations are given by, respectively
where y is the deviation of output from the natural rate and f captures …scal policy 16 .
For example, f > 0 could denote a …scal de…cit (either debt …nanced or money …nanced 17 ) 16 To be more precise, f is the stabilization component of …scal policy (which varies over the business cycle). Total …scal policy is then F = f 0 + f , where f 0 is …xed and chosen so that F e = f 0 + f e = 0, so that the government budget constraint on average. 17 In principal these alternative modes of …nance need not be equivalent. However, in the context of a liquidity trap, Ball (2005) shows that there are no long run di¤erences arising from these alternative modes of …nance. while f < 0, a …scal surplus. But f could also denote a temporary balanced budget reallocation of taxes and subsidies that has a net expansionary e¤ect; for instance Dixit and Lambertini (2000) . i 0 is the nominal interest rate, is the rate of in ‡ation, e is expected in ‡ation 18 and is a demand shock 19 . The instruments of policy are i and f .
The demand shock takes two values, a; a, with equal probability, where a > 0, hence
The aggregate demand equation re ‡ects the fact that demand is increasing in the …scal impulse, f , and decreasing in the real interest rate; it is also a¤ected by demand shocks. The aggregate supply equation shows that deviations of output from the natural rate are caused by unexpected movements in the rate of in ‡ation. Note the absence of parameters in (2.1), (2.2) . This is because our conclusions do not qualitatively depend on the values of such parameters (see Section 5). So we have suppressed them to improve readability.
Equating aggregate demand and supply we get from (2.1) and (2.2), our reduced form equations for output and in ‡ation.
Hence, …scal policy, monetary policy and in ‡ation expectations (in the spirit of New Keynesian models) have an a¤ect on output (and so also on unemployment) and in ‡ation.
Microfoundations
Our model is inspired by the microfounded dynamic model of monopolistic competition and staggered price setting in Lambertini (2000, 2003) . Our structural model in (2.1),(2.2) (or its variant with the full set of parameters given in (5.1), (5.2) below) is 18 The following formulation might appear even more plausible
AS : y t = t e t where e t = E t 1 t and e t+1 = E t t+1 . However, in our model, the private sector has to make its decision before the realization of the demand shock t . Hence, in the aggregate demand curve, it has to forecast e t+1 at time t 1. But E t 1
While this is true in our model, it is not true more generally. 19 The modern literature on the liquidity trap stresses demand shocks as major contributory factors. We could also consider supply shocks. The main di¤erence is as follows. A su¢ ciently negative demand shock will push the economy into a liquidity trap. On the other hand, a su¢ ciently positive supply shock will also create a liquidity trap. In either case, the real interest rate fails to drop su¢ ciently to match demand with supply. Hence our framework can be easily extended to incorporate supply, as well as demand, shocks. similar to Dixit and Lambertini 20 . In the Dixit and Lambertini framework, unexpected movements in in ‡ation have real e¤ects because prices are staggered. Alternatively, a range of 'rational inattention'theories currently compete as potential explanations for the presence of the unexpected in ‡ation term in (2.2). For instance, see Sims (2003) . 21 
Notation
We shall write a variable with a subscript (sometimes a superscript) '+', for example, y + , to denote the realization of that variable in the (good) state of the world, = a. Analogously, to denote the realization of the same variable in the (bad) state of the world, = a, we use a subscript (sometimes a superscript) ' ', for example, y .
Social Preferences
Society's preferences over output and in ‡ation are given by the social welfare function,
The …rst term shows that departures of output from its desired level, y S (note that y S is the di¤erence between desired output and the natural rate), are costly. We assume that
This captures the fact that the natural level of output is socially suboptimal (unless y S = 0) 22 .
The second term in (2.6) indicates that in ‡ation reduces social welfare. The third term captures the fact that the exercise of …scal policy is more costly than that of monetary 20 However, our model has the following di¤erences from Dixit-Lambertini. (1) We normalize the natural rate of output to zero, hence, the additive shock (in (2.1) or in (2.4)) can also be interpreted as a shock to the natural rate of output. (2) Our model has the New Keynesian feature that expected in ‡ation, e , also a¤ects actual in ‡ation, . (3) Our stochastic structure allows persistence (see section 5 below). While there is no persistence in Dixit-Lambertini, they allow all parameters to be stochastic, hence, considering the possibility of non-additive shocks. (4) In our model a …scal impulse acts on the demand side, creating greater output and in ‡ation. However, in Dixit-Lambertini …scal policy works on the supply side and takes the form of a subsidy to imperfectly competitive …rms that increases output but reduces prices. 21 Most dynamic structural models used in the analysis of a liquidity trap are forward looking New Keynesian models. Gertler (2003) , Mankiw (2002) note dissatisfaction with this model in terms of its inability to explain persistence in the data. Recent work, for instance, Rudd and Whelan (2006), casts doubt even on the hybrid variant proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999) . Of course, similar criticisms apply to the version of our model microfounded along the lines of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) . Thus, all current macroeconomic models lack satisfactory microfoundations. 22 The microfoundations for this in Lambertini (2000, 2003) rest on the presence of monopolistic competition. Monopoly power in the product market reduces output below the e¢ cient level, hence, giving policy makers an incentive to raise output. There are also a large number of other well known reasons for (2.7) but the ultimate cause, argue Alesina and Tabellini (1987) , is the absence of non-distortionary taxes. For if they were available then other market failures could be corrected. policy 23 . We model this as imposing a strictly positive cost of …scal policy, f 2 , but no cost of using the monetary policy 24 . The cost of using …scal policy could include deadweight losses, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003) , costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for default. From (2.6) we see that the …rst best obtains when = 0, f = 0, and y = y S . However, from (2.1) and (2.2), it follows that this cannot be an outcome of a rational expectations equilibrium (unless y S = 0).
For expositional clarity we omit parameters in (2.6), but see Section 5. On the microfoundations of such a social welfare function, see Lambertini (2000, 2003) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) .
Treasury and Social Preferences
We will assume for now that society can, if it desires, delegate policy to a "Treasury"that fully internalizes its objective function given in (2.6). So we will use society and Treasury interchangeably here. Other assumptions are considered in Section 5 below.
Sequence of Moves
At the …rst stage the economy designs its institutions, which assign powers of policy-making decisions to one or two independent policy makers. This is followed by the formation of in ‡ationary expectations, e , and the signing of nominal wage contracts in anticipation of future in ‡ation. Next, the demand shock, , is realized. In light of the actual realization of the shock, the relevant policy makers then decide on the optimal values of the policy variables, f and i. We shall also derive the optimal rational expectations solution (precommitment benchmark) in which the last stage is conducted up-front i.e. the (state contingent) policy variables f and i are announced to the economy prior to the resolution of demand uncertainty.
The Precommitment and Discretionary Solutions 3.1. The Precommitment Regime (The optimal rational expectations solution)
In this section we calculate the globally optimal solution in the class of all rational expectations solutions 25 . The global optimality of the precommitment solution serves as a useful benchmark. The sequence of moves is described below. The solution method is to …nd state contingent rules for the policy variables, i( ), f ( ), i.e., (i ; f ), (i + ; f + ), that maximize the expected value of the social welfare (2.6) under the constraints (2.4), (2.5) and the rational expectations condition e = E [ ], i.e.
The results are summarized in Proposition 1. Superscript 'e'denotes expected value.
Proposition 1 : The optimal state-contingent rational expectations precommitment solution is given by = 0 when = a. 25 Strictly speaking, this is a second best solution. The …rst best obtains if the imperfections responsible for the liquidity trap are removed. It is variously referred to as the 'precommitment solution', the 'optimal rational expectations solution', the 'second best solution'or simply the 'optimal solution'.
From Proposition 1 note that @U S @i Opt < 0 when = a. Hence, the economy is always liquidity trapped when = a. In this case, monetary policy is not e¤ective, i = 0. Hence, the government must commit to using expensive …scal policy, f = 2 5 a, in order to 'lean against the wind'. By contrast, when = a, monetary policy is e¤ective, i + = 6 5 a, and the government has no need for the expensive …scal instrument, f + = 0 26 .
Also note that output is below the natural rate (which is normalized to zero) in the liquidity trap ( = a) but above it otherwise ( = a). On average, it equals the natural rate (recall that y measures the deviation of output from the natural rate). In ‡ation is positive in both states of the world. The real interest rate is negative 27 a and i + = 6 5 a, are increasing in the size of the shock. This is not surprising as each of these policies ful…lls a stabilization role and a larger shock elicits a greater e¤ort in "leaning against the wind".
The solution is independent of y S , society's desired output relative to the natural rate. As in time consistency models in the absence of the liquidity trap, this occurs because, even if society has a high y S , the precommitment technology allows it to counter expectations of ex-post surprise in ‡ation (designed to push output towards the high target).
The magnitude of social welfare in this regime depends negatively on the variance of shocks hitting the economy, a 2 , and also on the output target of society, y S .
Finally, note that the values of i + , i ,f + ,f of the instruments are optimal ex-ante. However, after the realization of the shock, = a or = a, the ex-post optimal values of i, f will, in general, be di¤erent from these. Thus, for successful implementation, this optimal rational expectations solution needs a precommitment technology. We discuss this in Section 4 below. Next we turn to the second regime in the paper: Discretion.
Discretionary Regime
In this case, the monetary instrument, i, and the …scal instrument, f , are both assigned to the Treasury. We calculate the time consistent discretionary policy. The sequence of moves is described below. Depending on the parameter values, a liquidity trap may or may not arise. Proposition 2 below summarizes the results when a liquidity trap, which is the focus of this paper, arises 28 .
Proposition 2 : For 1 2 a y S < a, the economy is liquidity trapped for = a < 0 but not liquidity trapped for = a > 0. The solution under discretion is given by For stabilization purposes, the costly …scal policy is used only in a liquidity trap when the monetary policy looses e¤ectiveness. As in the precommitment solution, deviations of output from the natural rate are zero on average i.e. y e = 0. The following corollary compares expected social welfare under Precommitment with that under Discretion. 28 The full set of results under discretion is given in Appendix-B.
Corollary 1 : For
(5y S 4a)
As one would expect, the presence of a liquidity trap does not alter the ranking between the Precommitment and the Discretion regimes, from a social welfare point of view.
Alice through the looking glass
Krugman (1998) observed that 'applying conventional modelling to liquidity trap conditions produces unconventional conclusions and policy recommendations'. To which he added (1999) 'The whole subject of the liquidity trap has a sort of Alice-through-thelooking-glass quality'. And indeed, our model exhibits these features, as we will now see.
Precommitment can have higher in ‡ation than Discretionary
In the traditional time inconsistency literature, in the absence of a liquidity trap, the optimal level of average in ‡ation is zero (given the welfare function (2.6)) while under discretion it is positive (unless y S = 0, in which case it is also zero); as is well known. The reason is that under discretion, agents perceive (correctly) that the government has an ex-post incentive to create surprise in ‡ation, while under precommitment ex-post surprise in ‡ation is institutionally ruled out.
When a liquidity trap occurs with a positive probability this changes dramatically. From Proposition 1 we see that the optimal level of average in ‡ation under precommitment now is positive ( e = 2a 5
), rather than zero. Under discretion e depends on y S . For
a, Proposition 2 gives a negative average expected in ‡ation rate ( e = 1 2 a), rather than a positive one. Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) calls this the de ‡ation bias.
The intuitive explanation is as follows. Under precommitment, it is optimal to have positive in ‡ation on average ( e = 2a 5
), despite its cost, to be able to deliver negative real interest rates (i e = 2a 5
) in the bad state of the world ( = a). However, this optimal policy is time inconsistent. If ex-post, the economy is in the good state ( = a) then the optimal real interest rate is positive (i + e = 4a 5
) which can be achieved more cheaply with zero in ‡ation. Hence, the policy maker has the incentive to renege on its commitment to positive in ‡ation. The rational private sector will perceive this and expect low future in ‡ation. This destroys the credibility of the announcement of high in ‡ation, unless a commitment technology is available.
Higher output targets are a good thing
In the standard textbook model in the absence of a liquidity trap, a higher value of desired output relative to the natural rate, y S > 0; is bad because it leads to high in ‡ation and no gain in output (y e = 0). The reverse occurs with a liquidity trap, y S > 0 is now good!
The intuition is that a higher y S increases in ‡ationary expectations (see Proposition 2) which, by reducing the real interest rate in a liquidity trap, reduces the need for using the expensive …scal instrument. If society has a high enough output target (and the Treasury follows it) then, in the discretionary regime, ex-post, a liquidity trap will not arise. However, this outcome might require using the costly …scal instrument excessively, which could be suboptimal. In section 4, below, we show this to be precisely the case.
Institutions and Delegation
In the delegation regime considered in this section, society gives the Central Bank the mandate of achieving an in ‡ation target B . The monetary instrument, which is the nominal interest rate, i, is assigned to the Central Bank whose objective is to attain the in ‡ation target B . We formalize this by assigning the following objective function to the Central Bank:
The …scal instrument, f , is controlled by the Treasury whose objective function is similar to that of society (2.6) but with, possibly, di¤erent in ‡ation and output targets:
where y T , T are the output and in ‡ation targets respectively of the Treasury. It is important to bear in mind the di¤erence between the socially desirable output level, y S , and the Treasury's output target, y T . The optimal value, y T , of y T , i.e., the value of y T that maximizes expected social welfare, might be very di¤erent from y S . In fact, our simulations show that y T is well below y S . Thus a …scal authority should be 'conservative' in the sense that it should aim for a lower output target than that desired by society, as in Rogo¤ (1985) . See, for example, Table 1 , below.
The Optimal Delegation Regime
Under optimal delegation, the game has …ve stages, shown in e ; .
Third, we determine e , assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector.
Fourth, we …nd the expected social welfare, EU S , as a function of y T ; B , which we maximize to …nd the optimal values of y T ; B which are denoted by y T ; B . We assume that the Treasury and Central Bank adopt the optimal in ‡ation target, B , and that the Treasury fully complies with the optimal output target, y T . Section 5, below, explores the possibility that the Treasury might not care for in ‡ation and/ or be unwilling to follow the optimal output target, y T , because it has its own output target, y T . For ease of reference, these concepts are summarized in the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 : y S is the output level preferred by society (0 is the in ‡ation level preferred by society, see (2.6)). y T and T are output and in ‡ation targets for the Treasury. B is the in ‡ation target for the Central Bank. y T and B are the values of y T and B that maximize expected social welfare, EU S , subject to the constraints of the model, where U S is given by (2.6). In section 5, below, we allow the Treasury to adopt an output target, y T , di¤erent from y T , consistent with its own agenda. 29 As stressed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , failure to meet the in ‡ation target in the liquidity trap does not signify failure of policy. A similar remark can be made with respect to the output target.
So why does the optimal delegation regime perform so well? The in ‡ation target given to the Central Bank provides a commitment to the necessary in ‡ation level when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. This a¤ects the (ex-ante) in ‡ation expectations which also apply to the (ex-post) liquidity trap ensuring the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity trap. Furthermore, in ‡ationary expectations are also in ‡uenced correctly by the output and in ‡ation targets given to the Treasury that provide it with the incentive to use the appropriate level of …scal policy in a liquidity trap. Such an institutional regime achieves the optimal balance between …scal and monetary policy by neither having to rely too much on costly in ‡ation outside the liquidity trap nor relying too much on costly …scal policy in a liquidity trap.
The general model
How are our results altered when we introduce the full set of parameters in the model and allow for persistence in the demand shocks with a general probability distribution? What if the Treasury has its own agenda, perhaps on account of electoral concerns or other political economy considerations such as lobbying or interest groups? These issues are considered in this Section. We demonstrate that the results of our model are robust to the following …ve extensions.
E1. Introduction of the full set of parameters.
E2. Persistent demand shocks.
E3. General probability distribution over the two states of the world.
E4. The Treasury might follow an output target, y T , di¤erent from the optimal output target, y T . Recall that y T will, in general, be di¤erent from the output level, y S , most desired by society.
E5. The Treasury and the Central Bank can have distinct in ‡ation targets i.e. T 6 = B .
A note on output and in ‡ation targets
In ‡ation Targets
There are two main cases. The in ‡ation targets of the Treasury and Central Bank either coincide (i.e. T = B ), or di¤er (i.e. T 6 = B ). In Section 4 we restricted attention to the case T = B . However, in Subsection 5.5, both cases i.e. T = B and T 6 = B are considered. We show that the optimal delegation regime works equally well in each of these two cases and achieves the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution. Whilst this does not have implications for the optimality of our suggested delegation regime we …nd the case T = B more natural and easier to interpret. Furthermore, we show in Subsection 5.8 that the optimal rational expectations solution can also be achieved if the central bank alone has an in ‡ation target while the Treasury simply follows the optimal output target given to it by society.
Output Targets
The Treasury is an arm of the government. If the natural rate of output is socially suboptimal, say on account of monopolistic competition, then the government may have an incentive to use …scal instruments to increase output beyond its natural rate, at least temporarily and a rational private sector will foresee this. The problem of assigning output targets is compounded by the di¢ culty of measuring deviation of output from its natural rate (compared with the lesser di¢ culty of measuring deviation of in ‡ation from its target value) and by the fact that output stability is only one (though important) consideration for government and voters (by contrast, monetary stability can be made the sole objective of the central bank). Hence, it is important to consider the case where the Treasury pursues its own agenda and sticks to its preferred value of the output target, y T , rather than follow the optimal output target, y T , that society assigns to it. Although in section 4 we restricted attention to the case y T = y T , Section 5.5 below considers both cases i.e. y T = y T and y T 6 = y T .
We proceed as follows. First, we derive the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution in this more general setting (Proposition 4). In general, this solution is time-inconsistent and, therefore, requires a commitment technology. We then consider the optimal delegation regime (…rst considered in Section 4.1, above). If the Treasury follows the optimal output target (i.e. y T = y T ), then the optimal delegation regime achieves the precommitment solution for all values of the parameters (Proposition 5). If, however, the Treasury cannot be given the optimal output target, and has its own agenda (i.e. y T 6 = y T ), then Section 5.7, below, shows that a 'near optimal'solution can still be achieved. What if the Treasury is not given an in ‡ation target or does not care about in ‡ation at all, but is willing to adopt the socially optimal output target? Section 5.8, below, shows that the optimal precommitment solution can still be achieved.
Description of the general model
The model is described by the following basic equations: where 0 < p < 1, s > 0 and 0 < 1. The variable x represents the previous period's shock and so is a measure of the persistence in the shock. The second component in (5.4), (5.5) shows the innovation terms. With probability p the shock takes the value and with probability 1 p it takes a value + . Hence E [ ] = p + (1 p) + = x and so in the absence of the persistence term, E [ ] = 0 as in the model presented in Section 2. 30 Thus, if an economy is close to a liquidity trap, a negative shock can push the economy into it. Because of persistence, it may take the economy several periods to get out of the liquidity trap.
Sequence of moves
The sequence of moves under the regimes of precommitment, discretion and the optimal delegation are as in Figures 3.1, 3 .2, 4.1 respectively, except that in any period, the realization of depends on the value of the of the shock in the previous period, x. The main e¤ect of this is to cause the optimal in ‡ation (and output) targets to be state dependent. This is in line with the results of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) who, however, consider only monetary policy.
Optimal Solution
The optimal rational expectations precommitment solution, the analogue of Proposition 1, is described below in Proposition 4. The intuition behind the results is similar to that behind Proposition 1 except that the magnitude of demand shocks in the past in ‡uence the state of the economy in the current period and so one needs to distinguish between 3 cases. Our main focus is on Case (b) where the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state. The proof is derived analogously to that of Proposition 1 and, so, is omitted.
then the economy is liquidity trapped in both states and the commitment solution is given by i = i + = 0,
x < (1 p) s then the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only and the commitment solution is given by i = f + = 0,
s then the economy is liquidity trapped in neither state and the commitment solution is given by f = f + = 0,
Proposition 4 illustrates the evolution of the economy over time. Suppose that the economy is liquidity trapped in period t. How does it get out of a liquidity trap? Proposition 4 (b), (c) gives the conditions required on how big the shocks must be in period t so that in period t + 1 the economy is not liquidity trapped in at least in one state of the world 31 .
The Optimal Delegation Regime
In this section we examine the possibility of achieving the optimal precommitment solution through appropriate institutional design. Here we extend the optimal delegation framework of Section 4.1 (details are suppressed to avoid repetition) to incorporate the …ve extensions E1 through E5 stated at the beginning of Section 5. The Treasury's objective function is given by
Note that the parameters , , are the same as in society's welfare function given in (5.3). Denote the optimal in ‡ation target of the Central Bank by B and the optimal output and in ‡ation targets of the Treasury by y T and T respectively. Proposition 5, below, states the results under optimal delegation. As in Proposition 4, the magnitude of the demand shock in the previous period gives rise to three subcases, although we are primarily interested in Case (b). The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3, so it is omitted. 
. Then the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under precommitment, and given by Proposition 4(a).
(b) Under the conditions of Proposition 4(b), give the Central Bank the in ‡ation target
and give the Treasury any output and in ‡ation target pair (y T ; T ) that satis…es
. Then the solution under optimal delegation is the same as under precommitment and is given by Proposition 4(b). Furthermore, The intuition behind the optimality of this delegation regime is as in Section 4.1 above. If the economy is not liquidity trapped in any state of the world we are in the standard textbook case where delegation to an independent Central Bank achieves the precommitment solution. Proposition 5(c) deals with this case. Our main case of interest, however, is when the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only; this is stated in Proposition 5(b). Here, the in ‡ation target of the Central Bank is uniquely determined while the Treasury's target pair y T ; T can be chosen from a menu of contracts that satisfy (5.9). To explain the indeterminacy of y T and T , note that the Treasury has two targets, y T and T , but just one instrument, f . Hence, the best it can hope for is hit just one of these targets or, more generally, a linear combination of them. Maximizing society's expected welfare yields the optimal linear combination of y T and T . This is given by (5.7) in the case of Proposition 5(a) and (5.9) in the case of Proposition 5(b). The negative slope signi…es that a high output bias is needed to compensate a low in ‡ation target for the Treasury.
What if the in ‡ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are identical? Corollary 2 describes the results when the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state. 
and the Treasury attains this target in the good state i.e. y + = y T .
In Figure 5 .1, the downward sloping line AA 0 is a graph of y T ( T ) de…ned in (5.7) or (5.9). The vertical line positioned at B re ‡ects the in ‡ation target for the central bank given in 5.8. Ignore the downward sloping line BB 0 for the moment.
Proposition 5 then shows how the optimal delegation regime can achieve the optimal precommitment solution in the following two cases, 1. The Treasury and the Central Bank can be given the same in ‡ation target Figure 5 .1 shows that the optimal delegation solution is given by point C, where 
Discretion
The results under discretion when we extend the basic model to extensions E1-E5 are similar to those stated in Proposition 2. The full set of results are given in Appendix-B; the method of proof is identical to that of Proposition 2, and is omitted. Denote by EU Disc , the expected welfare level under discretion; we make use of it in Section 5.7 below.
Suboptimal Delegation: Treasury follows its own agenda (y T 6 = y T )
We now consider the case where the Treasury does not adopt the optimal output target (see discussion in subsection 5.1.2 above); we call this regime 'suboptimal delegation'. The output target y T now represents the Treasury's own agenda and it refuses to accept the optimal output target, y T . The objective function of the Treasury is given in (5.6). For pedagogical simplicity, we stick here to the more natural case where the in ‡ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank are equal i.e. B = T . Let B (y T ) maximize society's expected welfare, given the output target, y T , of the Treasury. For the general case in Section 5 the expression for y T ( B ) is too unwieldy, but for the simple model presented in Section 2 it is given by
In Figure 5 .1, the line BB 0 is a sketch of (the inverse of) B (y T ). Any point on the line BB 0 gives the optimal in ‡ation target for the Central Bank, B (y T ), conditional on the Treasury's private, but not necessarily optimal, output target, y T . which is steeper than the schedule y T ( T ) plotted as line AA 0 .
Suppose that the Treasury's output target is given by y T = y Because point D is o¤ the line AA, which plots the optimal menu of contracts for the Treasury, how well does the suboptimal delegation regime fare, relative to the optimal precommitment solution? Simulations, below, show that the performance of the suboptimal delegation regime is 'near optimal'and much better than discretion.
Denote the expected social welfare level under suboptimal delegation by EU SD S . The state contingent values of the policy variables in this case run into several pages, so we con…ne ourselves to reporting a representative sample of simulation results. Towards this end we de…ne the following variables.
is the expected welfare level under the optimal solution relative to the expected welfare under suboptimal delegation. Note that 0 < q 1 and q = 1 when y T = y T (see Proposition 5) .
is the ratio of the expected welfare under discretion relative to that under suboptimal delegation. Note that ! > 0 because the numerator and denominator are both negative.
is the ratio of the welfare loss under suboptimal delegation relative to that under the optimal solution when each is expressed as a di¤erence from the expected welfare level under discretion. Hence, relative to the discretionary solution as a benchmark, this is the proportional loss to society in moving from the optimal solution to the suboptimal delegation solution. Note that Q = 1 for y T = y T (see Proposition 5) . o = y S =y T is the output target of society relative to the optimal output target given to the Treasury. t = y T =y T is the output target of the Treasury relative to the optimal output target given to it.
The feasible set of parameters belongs to a ten dimensional set. We give below simulations for a representative sample of parameters in Tables 1, 2 below. Tables 4 through  6 in Appendix-C give further simulation results to support our assertions. To simplify results, we focus on cases where the output targets of the Treasury and society coincide i.e. y T = y S (and so o = t) and the in ‡ation targets of the Treasury and the Central Bank also coincide i.e. T = B .
The main results of the simulations can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 : Even if the private agenda of the Treasury, i.e. y T , is substantially different from the optimal output target, y T , the expected welfare level under the suboptimal delegation solution is very close to the optimal precommitment solution i.e. q is very close to 1. Suppose that we start with the minimal institutional framework of the discretionary regime. Then moving to the institutional regime of suboptimal delegation recovers, for all parameter values that we have investigated, a very large percentage of the bene…t that might accrue if one could move to the optimal solution i.e. Q is typically very close to 1. In Table 1 , the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Even if the output target of the Treasury is up to 602:2 times higher than the optimal output target (i.e. o = t = 602:2), q and Q are still very close to 1. Tables 4-6 , in the appendix, con…rm these results for other parameter values. In Table 2 , below, constructed under the conditions of Proposition 5(a), the economy is liquidity trapped in both states and there is a very high level of persistence in the demand shocks. ; y T = y S = ps; x = (1 p) s; = From Table 2 , the social loss in the discretionary regime is, in some cases, twice that under suboptimal delegation.
What happens if the Treasury does not have an in ‡ation target?
Here we consider two alternative regimes. In both of these cases, the Central Bank is given an in ‡ation target B , i.e., has the objective function given in (4.1) but the Treasury is not given an in ‡ation target. We …nd that these regimes are able to achieve the precommitment solution.
The Treasury is an "output nutter"
If the Treasury is not given an in ‡ation target, we call it an output nutter. Its objective function is then given by
The Treasury is a "reckless output nutter"
If the Treasury cares neither about in ‡ation nor the costs of …scal policy we call it a reckless output nutter. Its objective function is then given by
We are interested in evaluating the performance of the alternative institutional regimes in which the Treasury does not care about in ‡ation. Proposition 7, below, shows that the optimal precommitment solution can be achieved; the proof is identical to that of Proposition 3 and, so, is omitted.
Proposition 7 : Unless the economy is liquidity trapped in both states of the world, if the Treasury can be assigned an optimal output target y T and the Central Bank is assigned an optimal in ‡ation target, B , then the outcome in the "output nutter"and the "reckless output nutter"cases is identical to the precommitment regime.
However, and unlike the suboptimal delegation regime, if the Treasury does not adopt the optimal output target, y T , then the outcome can be very poor, and much worse than the outcome under discretion. Table 3 gives a sample of results for the "output nutter" case. In this case, Q can take extreme negative values i.e. the output nutter regime turns out to be much worse than discretion; we summarize this result in the Proposition below.
Proposition 8 : If the Treasury is not assigned the optimal output target, y T , then the performance of the "output nutter"and the "reckless output nutter"regimes can be very adverse and, possibly, much worse than the discretionary regime. In particular, if monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank, with an optimal in ‡ation target, while the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, then the outcome can be poor and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and …scal policy.
Proposition 8 indicates the serious consequences that can arise if the Treasury/ government does not have the appropriate in ‡ation or output targets even if it follows society's most preferred output target (note y T = y S in Table 3 ). This has relevance for understanding the Japanese experience in which the …scal authorities, as pointed out earlier, were not delegated with the optimally designed targets.
Summary
Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 establish that the optimal delegation regime (where the Bank has an optimal in ‡ation target and the Treasury has optimal output and in ‡ation targets) achieves the precommitment solution for all parameter values. Proposition 6 shows that performance of the suboptimal delegation regime (similar to the optimal delegation regime, except that the Treasury has its own output target) is near optimal, and much better than discretion, even when the Treasury deviates considerably from the optimal output target. Proposition 7 establishes that the output nutter and the reckless output nutter (in both cases the Bank and Treasury are given optimal in ‡ation and output targets, respectively, but the Treasury is not given an in ‡ation target) regimes also achieve the precommitment solution. However, Proposition 8 shows that the latter two regimes, unlike the suboptimal delegation regime, perform poorly, and can be much worse than discretion, if the Treasury deviates from the optimal output target. Thus, although giving the Treasury an in ‡ation target as well as an output target is not necessary for optimality, it is necessary to achieve robustness. In particular, a hybrid system, where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an in ‡ation target, but where the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, can perform poorly and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both monetary and …scal policy.
Relation to the literature
The role of …scal policy in theoretical models on the liquidity trap has not been adequately stressed despite this being Keynes's (1936) original solution to the problem. This is puzzling in light of the empirical evidence from Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001) which suggests that …scal policy, when used in Japan, has been potent. The simulation exercises of Ball (2005) show that …scal transfers equal to 6.6 percent of GDP could have ended Japan's output slump. There have been other suggestions in the literature, without a full theoretical model, that advocate …scal policy in a liquidity trap. Bernanke (2002) recommends a broad based tax cut while Gertler (2003) recommends transitory …scal policy. We consider …scal policy explicitly in a Dixit and Lambertini (2003) framework when there is the possibility of a liquidity trap.
The theoretical literature has considered aspects of our optimal delegation regime, that achieves the precommitment solution. For instance, in ‡ation targets have been suggested in Krugman (1998) , Nishiyama (2003) , and Iwamura et al. (2005) . Other variants of monetary policy commitment have also been considered. Benhabib Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) consider a commitment to switch from an interest rate rule to a money growth rate peg in a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) propose a commitment to adjust nominal interest rates to achieve a time varying price level target. Bernanke (2002) suggests a commitment to a bu¤er zone for the in ‡ation rate. Svensson (2003) advocates a price level target (as part of a larger set of policies). However, none of these models allow for the possibility of strategic interaction between monetary and …scal authorities nor jointly derive the optimal set of targets and instruments of the two policy making authorities. Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) studies the liquidity trap within a new Keynesian stochastic general equilibrium model with a government budget constraint and explicit microfoundations. Eggertsson recommends abandonment of an independent central bank and a return to discretionary policy by a unitary monetary-…scal authority. A debt …nanced …scal expansion during a liquidity trap results, via the government budget constraint, in higher expectations of future in ‡ation. Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either monetary policy alone or uncoordinated monetary and …scal policy. However, as Eggertsson shows, even optimal discretion is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations solution with commitment. Moreover, abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a narrow mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears to be a retrograde step. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) consider strategic interaction between …scal and monetary authorities, but in the absence of a liquidity trap. Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) show that the equilibrium with the …scal authority acting as leader is superior to the Nash equilibrium. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show that this regime can achieve the optimal precommitment rational expectations solution.
One of the important lessons of our paper (see Figure 1 .2 and Section 5) is that an optimally derived target for one policy maker while ignoring the incentives and constraints facing the other policy maker can lead to extremely poor outcomes; witness the last row in Figure 1 .2.
The optimality of …scal delegation to the Treasury in our paper is quite similar to the successful policy arrangements introduced in Britain by the chancellor Gordon Brown.
The intuition is that if there were no liquidity trap, and the Treasury had its own agenda 32 , then it would undermine the Central Bank's monetary commitment. However, appropriate delegation of policy to the Treasury, far from undermining monetary commitment, gives it an incentive to engage in an 'appropriate'…scal stimulus in a liquidity trap, where the independent Central Bank is ine¤ective.
Conclusions
In a liquidity trap, with nominal interest rates bound below by zero, an expectation of positive in ‡ation is needed. This in turn needs a credible commitment to a future level of positive actual in ‡ation. The credibility problem comes about because after the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties to renegotiate and reduce in ‡ation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low future in ‡ation. With low expected future in ‡ation, the real interest rate remains positive, keeping the economy in the liquidity trap; see for instance Krugman (1998) . The …rst best solution obtains when the rigidities that give rise to the liquidity trap are removed. But removal of these distortions is usually slow and di¢ cult (witness the experience of Japan). In this case, macroeconomic policy can have an important role. Furthermore, the Japanese experience suggests that issues of strategic monetary …scal policy interaction assume even greater importance in a liquidity trap.
In the solution considered here, society delegates monetary policy to an operationally independent Central Bank with an in ‡ation target. Fiscal policy is delegated to the Treasury with in ‡ation and output targets. Furthermore, the Treasury acts as a leader and the Central Bank is the follower. The required institutional arrangements are quite natural and are able to achieve the second best solution, namely, the best rational expectations precommitment solution. This institutional setting provides (1) the appropriate level of in ‡ation and, hence, in ‡ation expectations and (2) the optimal balance between monetary and …scal policy. Even if the Treasury deviates considerably from the optimal output target, we …nd that the performance of this solution is still 'near optimal'and much better than the regime where the Treasury is given discretion over monetary and …scal policy.
On the other hand, we …nd that the hybrid system where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank with an optimal in ‡ation target, but where the Treasury retains discretion over …scal policy, can perform badly and much worse than had the Treasury retained discretion over both …scal and monetary policy. This is in line with the case when there is no liquidity trap considered by Lambertini (2003, p1523, point 4) : "Commitment achieves the second best only if it can be extended to both monetary and …scal policy".
Appendix
Generic Equilibrium: To save space, we carry out some calculations that are relevant to both Proposition 1 (Precommitment) and Proposition 2 (Discretion).
Substituting (2.4) and (2.5) into (2.6),
Since f ? 0 and i 0 the …rst order conditions are as follows.
Since f is unrestricted, the optimal f satis…es 
Substituting (8.14) in (8.13) the expected social welfare is
We maximize E [U S ] subject to i + 0 and i 0. Formally
Solving the …rst order conditions simultaneously, using the condition of rational expectations (8.14) and the equations for output and in ‡ation in (2.4) and (2.5), one obtains the solution for the policy variables and the macroeconomic magnitudes reported in Proposition 1. Proof of Proposition 2 (Discretion: Economy is liquidity trapped only under adverse demand conditions, = a) Since = a and = a, each occur with probability ; the condition for rational expectations, using (8.11) 
The magnitudes of output and in ‡ation can now be found from (2.4), (2.5), (8. We start with the case where the economy is liquidity trapped in the the bad state ( = a) only. The other cases will be considered at the end.
The economy is in a liquidity trap ( = a) In this case, at = a the interest rate can go no lower than zero. Using (8.26), f + 2 e B a < 0, and so i = 0 (8.27)
The economy is not in a liquidity trap ( = a) In this case, i 0, hence (8.26) holds with equality. Solving out for i at = a, gives
The state contingent reaction function of the monetary authority is given by (8.27 ) and (8.28) .
Fiscal authority' s reaction function
The Treasury now chooses its state contingent …scal policy f to maximize the objective function (4.2) after observing e and and knowing that the state contingent reaction function of the monetary authority is given by (8.27 ) and (8.28).
Case-I: Liquidity trap ( = a)
In this case, the subsequent monetary policy is i = 0, hence, using (2.4), (2.5), (4.2) and T = B , the government maximizes: The state contingent reaction function of the …scal authority is given by (8.30) Comparing with Proposition 1, we see that the in ‡ation and output targets achieve the optimal solution, with the economy liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Hence, the two other cases, when the economy is never liquidity trapped and when the economy is liquidity trapped in both states, need not be considered; thus the proof is complete.
Appendix-B:
The discretionary regime in the general case Proposition 9 : (a) Let = signum ( ' 2 ). If
then the economy is liquidity trapped in both states and the solution under discretion is given by i = i + = 0
then the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only and the solution under discretion is given by i = f + = 0 Tables 4, 5, 6 report the most interesting case: the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Table 4 below con…rms results similar to those in Table 1 when the probability of falling into the liquidity trap is very remote i.e. p = In Table 4 , even if the output target of the Treasury, y T , is 5158.2 times that of the optimal output target, y T , results R1 and R2 above still hold. Tables 5, 6 below con…rm the two main results, R1 and R2, for much smaller output targets of the Treasury y T = y S = ps when the probability of falling into the liquidity trap takes a high and a low value respectively. 
